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Over the past months I’ve reviewed almost two dozen video clips of officers dealing with resisting suspects. For the officers involved, the outcomes ranged from bruises and lacerations to life-long disabilities. For the suspects, the outcomes ranged from minor bruises to death.
Given the levels of suspect resistance in the preliminary stages of engagement, none of the officers should have suffered more than incidental bruising and perhaps some muscle strain. Given the opportunities and openings the suspects offered to the cops, in my opinion, none of the suspects should have suffered anything more significant than intense temporary pain, moderate bruising and some road-contact abrasions.
To be blunt, the officers seemed to be trying so hard to avoid “escalating the use of force” that they themselves suffered needless injuries as a result — and so did the suspects. That’s not an opinion of civil or criminal culpability, and shouldn’t be read as such. In each case, the officers’ actions are easily defensible and justifiable, and in fact, their actions appear commendable in the sense that they employed minimal force at each stage of these enounters, but the situations spun rapidly out of control.
The problem is, those officers consistently employed less than effective force to end the confrontation before serious injury or death could occur.
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“PERSUASION By Patting & Touching”
It’s impossible in this space to describe all of these encounters in detail, but a common thread ran among them, and it went like this: In almost every case, the officers’ initial physical contacts with their suspects were hesitant andrestrained — even gentle — lacking theforce required to establish immediate control. Initial resistance by suspects was only slightly more forceful; an easy rolling of wrists and arms to avoid being grasped, lightly deflecting the officers’ hand(s) or turning away without sudden violent motion.
Officers’ following actions only minutely increased the level of force, consisting of plucking at sleeves, reaching a bit more swiftly for hands, placing a hand on a shoulder, etc. Their actions still seemed to be more about convincing than controlling; sort of “persuasion by patting and touching.”
As suspects’ resistance levels increased, the officers’ responses escalated only incrementally, seeming to continually lag behind the suspects’ actions until eventually, ferocious fights reached potentially deadly levels. They should never have gotten that far.
There were numerous indications officers knew and applied recognized arrest and control techniques. The problem was, they were applied against levels of resistance that demanded the use of stronger, more forceful tactics. A stiff push to an officer’s chest should not result in a tentative grab for the suspect’s wrist.
Time and again, the force used was too little, too late. Now why would offi-cers who have been trained in the use of force fail to use that force at the appropriate points in time, in order to assure as afer, more survivable outcome for all involved? I think I know.
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The Message & The Massage
The science of Use of Force and Arrest & Control has become far more codified and formalized in recent years. It’s also become far more stylized, withmany distinctly different “schools”of techniques. Also, LE agencies have tended to rely less on inhouse trainers and employ more contracted specialists.
The reasons are many, including a desire to shift the target of possible litigation to an “outsider,”creating a showing of “commitment to excellence” (read this one,“We spent the big bucks to bring ina world-class trainer”) to the sadold proverb that says, “a prophet isnever recognized in his own vil-lage” — meaning that no matter how talented your local Warrior-Wizard is, the Chief probably think she’s just another schmuck.
To distinguish themselves from their competitors, many of these trainers have developed their own “force matrixes,” ladders, pyramids and pie-charts, with their own proprietary terms and language, applying to “when to use what level of force.” All of this is often delivered in one high-intensity annual in-service training session. To make matters worse, many agencies play “musical martial artists” from year to year, piling confusion on complexity.
Officers do learn some valuable tactics, and when to use them appropriately. But then the messageis often massaged. By that I mean through attitude, demeanor, off-the-cuff statements and ill-advised com-mendations and reprimands, officers are left with the impression that, to put it simply, they have to get hit first to hit back; that they must always use less force than is used against them.
After one of my officers got his butt kicked, I asked him why he didn’t use his baton. He responded, “Because you can only use it on guys armed with something, right?” He didn’t get that message intraining, but after being hammered with high-ranking officers’ warnings about “going crazy with a stick on unarmed suspects,” that was the massage he was left with. Another time, an officer was praised and commended for dancing around a knife-wielding suspect for several minutes and finally kicking the blade out of his hand. Some chiefs loved it. I told him he should have been suspended. The wrong message was sent to many, many cops.
Sergeant As Interpreter
This is where you come in. Make sure your officers have and practice a simple suite of pain-compliance holds, blows, blocks and kicks as taught in training — and when they should use them. The emphasis should be on fast, complete control of subjects, before anyone becomes needlessly hurt. Lay off the loopy language and strip the sophistication, bearing down on the basics. And always, always assure them you’re available to interpret confl-icts and confusion — and that their safety comes first.
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John Morrison se
rved in combat as a Marine sergeant, and retired as a senior lieutenant from the San Diego Police Department, having served there as Director of Training, Commanding Officer of SWAT and division executive officer. He has taught, written and lectured widely on training, tactics and leadership. Contact him at StreetLevelOne@yahoo.com.
First published in the May/June 2007 issue of American COP. |
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